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Mary Astell on Virtuous Friendship 
Jacqueline Broad 
 
According to some scholars, Mary Astell’s feminist programme is severely limited by its 
focus on self-improvement rather than wider social change. In response, I highlight the 
role of ‘virtuous friendship’ in Astell’s 1694 work, A Serious Proposal to the Ladies. 
Building on classical ideals and traditional Christian principles, Astell promotes the 
morally transformative power of virtuous friendship among women. By examining the 
significance of such friendship to Astell’s feminism, we can see that she did in fact aim 
to bring about reformation of society and not just the individual. 
 
The seventeenth-century English writer Mary Astell (1666–1731) presents a challenge 
to some of our modern preconceptions about feminist pioneers. Far from being a 
radical revolutionary, Astell was a profoundly conservative political thinker. As a 
High-Church Anglican and a Tory royalist, she was an active campaigner against the 
toleration of Protestant dissenters in early eighteenth-century England. Unlike her 
Whig contemporaries, such as John Locke, she did not regard political liberty or 
freedom from religious persecution as the unquestionable right of all human beings. In 
terms of political allegiances, she was diametrically opposed to the ‘republic of 
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letters’ devoted to universal religious toleration in late seventeenth-century Europe. 
Recent commentators point to the fact that Astell’s religio-political conservatism 
shapes and informs every aspect of her philosophy—including her feminist ideas.1 In 
the 1706 edition of her Reflections upon Marriage, Astell observed that not even well-
known advocates of resistance, such as John Milton, ‘wou’d cry up Liberty to poor 
Female Slaves, or plead for the Lawfulness of Resisting a Private Tyranny’.2 But it 
was never her intention to take up where Milton had left off—Astell was not an 
advocate for the political right of resistance or freedom from slavery for women. For 
her, women’s liberty was a spiritual rather than a political concept: it consisted in a 
woman’s freedom to choose (or not to choose) that which was good for her soul, and 
it could be exercised by any woman, anywhere, regardless of her social or political 
circumstances.  
For a modern reader, the spiritual focus of Astell’s feminism threatens to 
render it unintelligible or perhaps even contradictory. On the one hand, Astell clearly 
recognises that women as a social group suffer from significant disadvantages due to 
the tyranny of men; and in her three major feminist works, A Serious Proposal to the 
Ladies (part I, 1694; part II, 1697) and Some Reflections upon Marriage (1700), she 
suggests ways in which to end male tyranny over the lives of women. But on the other 
hand, Astell maintains that true tyranny is tyranny over a woman’s spiritual life and 
                                                
1 See Patricia Springborg, Mary Astell: Theorist of Freedom from Domination (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005); Hilda L. Smith, ‘“Cry up Liberty”: The Political Context for Mary Astell’s 
Feminism’, in Mary Astell: Reason, Gender, Faith, eds. William Kolbrener and Michal Michelson 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 193–204; and Rachel Weil, ‘Mary Astell: The Marriage of Toryism 
and Feminism’, in her Political Passions: Gender, the Family, and Political Argument in England, 
1680–1714 (Manchester and New York: 1999), pp. 142–59. These recent studies build upon the earlier 
insights of Florence M. Smith, Mary Astell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1916); Joan K. 
Kinnaird, ‘Mary Astell and the Conservative Contribution to English Feminism’, The Journal of British 
Studies 19, no. 1 (1979), 53–75; Ruth Perry, The Celebrated Mary Astell: An Early English Feminist 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1986); Ruth Perry, ‘Mary Astell and the Feminist Critique of 
Possessive Individualism’, Eighteenth-Century Studies 23 (1990), 444–57; and Catherine Gallagher, 
‘Embracing the Absolute: The Politics of the Female Subject in Seventeenth-Century England’, 
Genders 1, no. 1 (1988), 24–39. 
2 Mary Astell, Reflections upon Marriage, in Astell: Political Writings, ed. Patricia Springborg 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 46–47. 
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her capacity to make judgments about right and wrong for the sake of her salvation. 
To rectify this tyranny, women do not need to rectify their disadvantages as a social 
group: each woman simply needs to improve her own individual capacity for rational 
deliberation and practical decision-making. In the second part of the Proposal, Astell 
shows how this self-improvement can be achieved through a woman’s own efforts, by 
following Cartesian rules for thinking. By learning to discipline the will, according to 
Astell, women can redirect their passions to worthy objects, and resist the influence of 
custom on their judgments about right and wrong. In keeping with her broader 
political views about passive obedience, Astell urges that women should not rebel 
against the rule of men, even when they are subject to physical and psychological 
abuse; the only acceptable course of action is for women to bring about their own self-
transformation. As Rachel Weil observes, ‘Astell approaches politics in a radically 
subjective manner: it is not about the rules governing relations between people in civil 
society, but about people’s relationship to themselves and to God’.3 
In this article, however, I argue that if we focus on Astell’s concept of 
friendship in the first part of her Proposal, then her feminism is somewhat more 
modern than it at first appears. In this Proposal, Astell’s programme for feminist 
reform does not consist in self-transformation alone, but also a transformation of other 
women’s moral values. Female friendships play an important role in bringing about 
this moral development. In a 1693 letter to the English theologian-philosopher, John 
Norris (1657–1711), Astell voices her intention to use friendship as a consciousness-
raising tool. She says that 
 
                                                
3 Weil, Political Passions, p. 146. 
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I am loath to abandon all Thoughts of Friendship, both because it is one of the 
brightest Vertues, and because I have the noblest Designs in it. Fain wou’d I 
rescue my Sex, or at least as many of them as come within my little Sphere, 
from that Meanness of Spirit into which the Generality of them are sunk, 
perswade them to pretend to some higher Excellency than a well-chosen 
Pettycoat, or a fashionable Commode; and not wholly to lay out their Time and 
Care in the Adornation of their Bodies, but bestow a Part of it at least in the 
Embellishment of their Minds.4 
 
In the following discussion, I show that Astell’s design has some affinity with those of 
recent feminist ethicists, such as Marilyn Friedman, who argue that close female 
friendships can provide women with a moral vantage point from which to identify, 
and then challenge, social norms and practices that are detrimental to their well-being. 
During her lifetime, Astell enjoyed many close and enduring friendships with 
women of high social standing, including her neighbour Lady Catherine Jones, and 
Lady Ann Coventry, Lady Elizabeth Hastings, and Elizabeth Hutcheson. These 
female friends were vitally important to Astell’s emotional and financial well-being as 
an unmarried gentlewoman in late seventeenth-century London: they not only 
provided her with an income (some were her patrons), but also supplied the comfort 
and support of a family (in her later years, Astell lived with Jones). In one letter to 
Norris, Astell confessed that she had ‘a strong Propensity to friendly Love’, and that it 
                                                
4 Mary Astell to John Norris, 31 October 1693; in Mary Astell and John Norris, Letters Concerning the 
Love of God, eds. E. Derek Taylor and Melvyn New (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), p. 80. On the 
differences between Astell’s ‘design of friendship’ in the Letters concerning the Love of God (1695) 
and that of her first Proposal, see William Kolbrener, ‘Astell’s “Design of Friendship” in Letters and A 
Serious Proposal, Part I’, in Mary Astell: Reason, Gender, Faith, eds. William Kolbrener and Michal 
Michelson (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 49–64. 
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was difficult to love her friends ‘without something of Desire’;5 in another, she 
declared that she loved Jones ‘with the greatest Tenderness’.6 These remarks have 
been the focus of some scholarly attention in the past.7 Here I outline Astell’s 
normative ideal of friendship, or her idea of what friendship should be like, rather 
than her personal experiences of friendship or her private concerns about falling short 
of that ideal. In the first part, I describe Astell’s concept of ‘virtuous friendship’, a 
concept that partly resembles the classical notion of friendship developed by Aristotle 
and passed on through the centuries by Cicero, Augustine, and others. In the second 
part, I situate Astell’s notion of friendship in the wider context of early modern debate 
about whether or not women are capable of friendship. And, in the third and final part, 
I show how Astell develops the traditional virtue of friendship—and female 
friendship, in particular—into a force for social change.  
 
I. Astell’s concept of friendship 
In her first published work, A Serious Proposal to the Ladies, for the Advancement of 
their True and Greatest Interest, Astell called upon her readers to support the 
establishment of a female academic institute in England. Calling herself a ‘Lover of 
her Sex’, she argued that the supposed intellectual inferiority of women was the result 
of custom rather than nature, and that if young women were provided with a higher 
education, then they might improve their natural understanding. In order to obtain this 
improvement, women required a retreat from ‘the noise and trouble, folly and 
temptation of the world’,8 and a sanctuary from ‘the rude attempts of designing Men’ 
                                                
5 Astell to Norris, 31 October 1693; in Astell and Norris, Letters, p. 80. In the context of Astell and 
Norris’s philosophy of love, ‘desire’ is a non-bodily tendency of the soul to love something as its good. 
6 Astell to Norris, 17 July 1694; in Astell and Norris, Letters, p. 66. 
7 See, for example, Perry, Celebrated Mary Astell, pp. 136–141. 
8 Mary Astell, A Serious Proposal to the Ladies, Parts I and II, ed. Patricia Springborg (London: 
Pickering & Chatto, 1997), p. 20. 
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(Proposal I, p. 39). They needed a ‘Monastery’ or a place of ‘Religious Retirement’ 
(Proposal I, p. 18), in which they could study the grounds of religion and philosophy 
for themselves in peace and quiet. The young scholars of this institution would live in 
the school environs for a number of years, and eat, sleep, and study with other women 
of a similar age and social status (the daughters of ‘Persons of Fortune’ or ‘Persons of 
Quality’; Proposal I, p. 39). An important feature of the institution is that it would 
provide women with opportunities to contract friendships with other women. In her 
institution, Astell says, 
 
You will only quit the Chat of insignificant people for an ingenious 
Conversation; the froth of flashy Wit for real Wisdom; idle tales for instructive 
discourses. The deceitful Flatteries of those who under pretence of loving and 
admiring you, really served their own base ends, for the seasonable Reproofs 
and wholsom Counsels of your hearty well-wishers and affectionate Friends, 
which will procure you those perfections your feigned lovers pretended you 
had, and kept you from obtaining (Proposal I, p. 19). 
 
The friendships in question do not consist in ‘insignificant dearnesses’ (Proposal I, p. 
36), or intimacies that are based upon flattery, gossip, and intrigue. Astell’s institution 
gives women the opportunity to contract ‘noble Vertuous and Disinteress’d 
Friendship’ (Proposal I, p. 20), or ‘the purest and noblest Friendship’ (Proposal I, p. 
35), or simply ‘Vertuous Friendship’ (Proposal I, p. 40) with one or two like-minded 
individuals. By virtuous friendship, Astell means ‘the greatest usefulness, the most 
refin’d and disinteress’d Benevolence, a love that thinks nothing within the bounds of 
Power and Duty, too much to do or suffer for its Beloved; And makes no distinction 
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betwixt its Friend and its self except that in Temporals it prefers her interest’ 
(Proposal I, pp. 36–7). Virtuous friendship consists in mutual acts of unself-interested 
benevolence between ‘two Persons of a sympathizing disposition, the make and frame 
of whose Souls bears an exact conformity to each other’ (Proposal I, p. 37). 
This idea of friendship as ‘disinteress’d Benevolence’ is consistent with Astell’s 
wider theory of love, a theory that closely resembles the moral philosophy of her 
correspondent, John Norris. Though Norris is often referred to as a ‘Cambridge 
Platonist’, he was in fact an Oxford man and the main English disciple of the French 
philosopher, Nicolas Malebranche. Norris was strongly influenced by Platonist and 
neo-Platonist views, but his philosophy also incorporated the ideas of Malebranche, 
Descartes, Augustine, and Aristotle, among others. Following the Scholastic tradition, 
Norris distinguishes between two types of love: a love of desire or concupiscence (the 
love that we owe God), on the one hand, and a love of charity or benevolence (the 
love that we owe other creatures), on the other.9 In the third volume of his Practical 
Discourses (1693), Norris argues in favour of this distinction with reference to the 
Malebranchean theory of causation known as occasionalism. Like Malebranche, 
Norris maintains that all material things are completely without causal power or force, 
and that they are incapable of directly influencing our souls. He claims that only a 
being of infinite wisdom and power could produce all things by the immediate 
efficacy of will, and therefore God is the only true causal agent, and the sole efficient 
cause of all our sensations. ‘’Tis not the most delicate Fruit, or the richest Perfume, 
that delights either our Tast or our Smell,’ he says, ‘but ‘tis God alone that raises 
                                                
9 On Norris’s theory of love, see Richard Acworth, The Philosophy of John Norris of Bemerton (1657–
1712) (New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 1979), pp. 154–83; W. J. Mander, The Philosophy of John 
Norris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 127–67. 
 8 
Pleasure in us by the Occasion of these Bodies.’
10
 While material objects may be the 
conditions or occasions of our sensations, they are not necessary conditions. For this 
reason, according to Norris, God must be the sole object of our love of desire; because 
creatures never really cause our sensations of pleasure, they do not merit our love. 
Though Astell hesitates to accept the metaphysical foundation of Norris’s theory,11 
she accepts his claim that only God deserves a love of desire, because he intentionally 
brings about everything for our greater good.  She also agrees that creatures deserve a 
love of benevolence alone; we are permitted to wish them well, or to will good for 
them, but we must not desire them as our good. The love of creatures encompasses 
not only the love of family members, neighbours, and friends, but also strangers and 
enemies. When it comes to friends, however, Astell has something more to say: for 
Astell, the love of benevolence between friends can also play a vital role in their 
moral development. 
To understand the moral value of friendship in Astell’s philosophy, it is useful 
to consider the similarities between her notion of friendship and the Aristotelian 
conception of friendship as the mutual desire to promote another’s well-being for her 
own sake. Though there is no evidence that Astell had read Aristotle (384–322 BC), 
she puts forward a philosophical concept that has much in common with his 
normative ideal of friendship. In book eight of the Nicomachean Ethics (350 BC), 
Aristotle identifies three different kinds of friendship: friendship based upon mutual 
advantage or utility; friendship based upon mutual pleasure; and friendship based 
                                                
10 John Norris, Practical Discourses Upon several Divine Subjects (London: S. Manship, 1693), vol. 
III, p. 55. 
11 Mary Astell to John Norris, 14 August 1694; Astell and Norris, Letters, pp. 131–33. On their 
exchange, see Broad, Women Philosophers, pp. 98–109; Sarah Ellenzweig, ‘The Love of God and the 
Radical Enlightenment: Mary Astell’s Brush with Spinoza’, Journal of the History of Ideas 64, no. 3 
(2003), 379–97; Eileen O’Neill, ‘Mary Astell on the Causation of Sensation’, in Mary Astell: Reason, 
Gender, Faith, eds. William Kolbrener and Michal Michelson (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 145–
163; Springborg, Mary Astell, pp. 58–67; E. Derek Taylor, ‘Mary Astell’s Ironic Assault on John 
Locke’s Theory of Matter’, Journal of the History of Ideas 62, no. 3 (2001), 505–22. 
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upon mutual recognition of the other’s moral goodness or excellence of character.12 
This last kind of friendship—the highest form of friendship, according to Aristotle—
is known as ‘perfect’ or ‘character’ friendship. Such friendship requires that two 
friends develop certain intentions toward one another: it consists in wanting (and 
actively promoting) a friend’s good for her own sake, and not for selfish motives. 
Character friends love one another for who they essentially are, and not for certain 
accidental properties or relations.13 The contracting of such friendship requires that 
two persons spend enough time together to become familiar with each other’s 
character; and that they share enough of their life to merge their interests and to forge 
lasting ties of love and affection. Aristotle’s concept of friendship had an enduring 
impact on subsequent western thought, and his ideal still shaped and informed most 
writings on the topic in the seventeenth century. 
In keeping with the Aristotelian tradition, Astell also treats virtuous friends as 
those who love one another for who they essentially are. Her institution is designed to 
give women enough time to be careful and judicious in the contracting of such 
friendships: 
 
But tho’ it be very desirable to obtain such a Treasure, such a Medicine of Life, 
(as the wise man speaks)14 yet the danger is great, least being deceiv’d in our 
choice, we suck in Poyson where we expected Health. And considering how apt 
we are to disguise our selves, how hard it is to know our own hearts much less 
anothers, it is not advisable to be too hasty in contracting so important a 
                                                
12 On Aristotle’s philosophical conception of friendship, see John M. Cooper, ‘Aristotle on the Forms 
of Friendship’, Review of Metaphysics 30, no. 4 (1977), 619–48; and Lorraine Smith Pangle, Aristotle 
and the Philosophy of Friendship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). For an overview of 
classical ideals of friendship, see Dirk Baltzly and Nick Eliopolous. ‘The Classical Ideals of 
Friendship’, in Friendship: A History, ed. Barbara Caine (London: Equinox, 2009). 
13 Cooper, ‘Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship’, 635. 
14 Ecclesiasticus 6.16: ‘A faithful friend is the medicine of life’. 
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Relation; before that be done, it were well if we could look into the very Soul of 
the beloved Person, to discover what resemblance it bears to our own, and in 
this Society we shall have the best opportunities of doing so. (Proposal I, p. 37) 
 
In the wider context of Astell’s Cartesian-inspired philosophy, the self is essentially 
the soul (a non-bodily or immaterial substance) and not the body (a material thing).15 
So when she recommends that we take care to look into ‘the very Soul of the beloved 
Person’, she recommends that we learn to love our friend for what she essentially is, 
and not for certain accidental features, such as physical appearance, social status or 
personal wealth. The resemblance of the friend’s soul to our own is important: Astell 
says that such friendship can contribute toward a woman’s self-improvement because 
virtuous friends will be as devoted to ‘bettering the beloved Person’ as they are to 
bettering themselves (Proposal I, p. 37). There can be no envy amongst such friends, 
for ‘how can she repine at anothers wel-fare, who reckons it the greatest part of her 
own’ (Proposal I, p. 20)? Virtuous friendship has a special power to deliver us from 
‘vicious selfishness’ (Proposal I, p. 36). 
Astell also follows the classical tradition by allowing that only virtuous agents 
can become character friends. In her institution, Astell says, friendships will not be 
‘cemented by Intrigues nor spent in vain Diversions, but in the search of Knowledge, 
and acquisition of Vertuous Habits, a mutual love to which was the Origin of ‘em’ 
(Proposal II, p. 75).16 Virtuous friendship originates in a mutual love of wisdom and 
virtue; and such friendship is itself ‘a Vertue which comprehends all the rest; none 
                                                
15 See Mary Astell, The Christian Religion, As Profess’d by a Daughter Of The Church of England. In 
a Letter to the Right Honourable, T.L. C.I. (London: R. Wilkin, 1705), p. 251. 
16 This common sentiment can also be found in the poem, ‘Ode to Friendship’, once attributed to Mary 
Astell but now thought to be the work of Samuel Johnson. For details and a transcription of the poem, 
see Perry, Celebrated Mary Astell, pp. 273–75. 
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being fit for this, who is not adorned with every other Vertue’ (Proposal I, p. 36).17 
Astell implies that if a person is a true friend, then her character will cultivate the 
virtues—such as the traditional virtues of wisdom/prudence, justice, moderation, and 
courage, as well as the Christian virtues of charity/love, faith, hope, and humility. 
Nevertheless, Astell does not support the view that friends must be fully or 
perfectly virtuous and that friendship is the sole province of moral saints or morally 
exceptional persons. In her second Proposal, she expresses scepticism about the 
possibility of being a fully virtuous friend and successfully meeting the friend’s duty 
to ‘better the beloved Person’ without losing the friendship. She says that 
 
this is so nice a matter, so laborious a task, that the more I consider it the more 
unable I find my self to give fit Directions to the performance of it. They who 
wou’d do that, must have a more exact Knowlege of Human Nature, a greater 
Experience of the World, and of those differences which arise from 
Constitution, Age, Education, receiv’d Opinions, outward Fortune, Custom and 
Conversation, than I can pretend to. (Proposal II, p. 175) 
 
While a virtuous friend must possess the virtues (in part or to some degree), she does 
not have to be fully or perfectly virtuous herself in order to become a friend in the first 
place.18 Later we will see that this qualification is important: in Astell’s view, the 
value of virtuous friendship lies in its power to promote moral growth; if virtuous 
friends are already morally perfect, then friendship will be redundant in this respect. 
 
                                                
17 In book eight of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle also classes friendship as ‘a kind of virtue’; see 
Aristotle, The Ethics of Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. J. A. K. Thomson, revised with notes 
and appendices by Hugh Tredennick, with an introduction and bibliography by Jonathan Barnes 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976), p. 258. 
18 On this notion in Aristotle, see Cooper, ‘Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship’, 627–29. 
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II. Women and friendship: the early modern discussion 
Astell was not the only writer of her time to conceive of virtuous friendship as a 
means to moral improvement. In the seventeenth century, a number of religious 
thinkers, such as Jeremy Taylor, John Norris, and Richard Allestree, resurrected the 
classical notion of friendship as a form of the Christian ideal of charity. Like other 
Christian moralists before them, such as St Aquinas, St Augustine, and Aelred of 
Rievaulx, they emphasise the role of virtuous friendship in the attainment of salvation 
and the soul’s ultimate union with God. Taylor and Norris are noteworthy for the fact 
that they highlight the question of a woman’s (and not just a man’s) capacity for 
friendship. These men are key influences on Astell’s own discussion of friendship—
though, as we will see, she takes the topic of women and friendship much further than 
they intended. 
In his Discourse of the Nature, Offices and Measures of Friendship, With Rules 
of conducting it (1657), Taylor (1613–67) answers the poet Katherine Philips’ queries 
about the possibility of friendships between men and women. In this work, he defines 
friendship (‘the greatest love, and the greatest usefulness’) as a special or limited 
form of the Christian charity that we owe to everyone.19 In a direct address to Philips, 
Taylor boasts that, unlike certain morose cynics, he does not deny women the capacity 
for such noble friendship (or virtuous friendship), and he concedes that some women 
have been brave and trustworthy friends. If we accept that imperfect men can be 
friends (because ‘no man is perfect’), he says, then we must also accept that women—
despite their imperfections—can be friends too. We cannot debar women from 
friendship simply because they are not more perfect than some men. If we were to do 
                                                
19 Jeremy Taylor, A Discourse of the Nature, Offices and Measures of Friendship, With Rules of 
conducting it. Written in answer to a Letter from the most ingenious and vertuous M.K.P. (London: R. 
Royston, 1657), p. 5. 
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so, then we would have to concede that all men are capable of perfection, yet few 
would be willing to admit such a blind partiality to the male sex. 
 
And when we consider that few persons in the world have all those excellencies 
by which friendship can be usefull and illustrious, we may as well allow women 
as men to be friends; since they can have all that which can be necessary and 
essentiall to friendship, and these cannot have all by which friendships can be 
accidentally improved. (Discourse, p. 90) 
 
Taylor was not the first writer to take this stance on male-female friendships—his 
opinion in fact echoes that of Aristotle in book eight of the Nicomachean Ethics. In a 
chapter on ‘unequal friendships’, Aristotle allows that friendships can exist between 
persons of unequal social standing.20 Though an ideal friendship consists of friends of 
equal status, it is still possible for one friend to recognise good qualities of character 
in another friend of lower social status. Such friendship, however, will be 
characterised by an asymmetry of affection, in which the person in authority receives 
more affection from the subordinate party, and the subordinate receives less from the 
superior. Aristotle classes friendships between husbands and wives as ‘friendships 
between unequals’. He does not appear to allow that men and women can ever have 
equal character friendships (the highest kind). In his Politics, Aristotle suggests that 
the subordination of wives to husbands is justified given that women are incapable of 
acquiring prudence, or the capacity to distinguish between good and bad in their 
practical deliberations (the prime virtue of rulers). A woman’s lack of prudence is 
demonstrated by the fact that, although she is capable of rational deliberation, she is 
                                                
20 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, pp. 269–71. 
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nevertheless unable to control her passions and act upon her understanding.21 Due to 
this ‘incontinence’, it seems to follow that there is no possibility of equal male-female 
friendships. Because women are inferior in virtue, they will always be in the position 
of the ruled, while men will be the rulers; men and women will always be unequal 
partners.22 
In the sixteenth century, the French thinker Michel de Montaigne (1533–92) 
echoed Aristotle’s viewpoint when he denied that women had the capacity to sustain 
lasting friendships with their husbands in marriage. In his essay ‘Of Friendship’, 
Montaigne claims that ‘the ordinary Talent of Women, is not such, as is sufficient to 
maintain the Conference and Communication required … nor do they appear to be 
endu’d with Constancy of Mind, to endure the pinch of so hard and durable a Knot’.23 
He points to the fact that ‘the Ancient Schools … wholly rejected’ the idea that 
women have the capacity for full and perfect friendships.24 Like Montaigne, Taylor 
also denies ‘that Women are capable of all those excellencies by which Men can 
oblige the World’ (Discourse, p. 88). He concedes that some virtuous women can be 
partners in noble friendships with men, but the best female friends will never be on a 
par with the best male friends. Though female friends may be ‘useful to some 
purposes’ (they ‘can adde so many moments to the felicity of our lives’, and provide 
the ‘prettinesses of friendship’), their usefulness does not extend as far as that of male 
friends (Discourse, pp. 89, 90). A woman might be an adequate friend in our days of 
joy, but a ‘man is the best friend in trouble’ (Discourse, p. 89). In Taylor’s view, 
                                                
21 See Leah Bradshaw, ‘Political Rule, Prudence, and the “Woman Question” in Aristotle’, Canadian 
Journal of Political Science 24, no. 3 (1991), 557–73 (esp. pp. 566–67, 572). 
22 For a recent discussion on women and friendship in Aristotle, see Ann Ward, ‘Mothering and the 
Sacrifice of Self: Women and Friendship in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics’, Thirdspace: A Journal of 
Feminist Theory and Culture 7, no. 2 (2008), 32–57. 
23 Michel de Montaigne, Essays of Michael Seigneur De Montaigne. In Three Books. With Marginal 
Notes and Quotations of the cited Authors. And an Account of the Author’s Life, trans. Charles Cotton 
(London: Printed for M. Gilliflower, W. Hensman, R. Bentley, and J. Hindmarsh, 1693), p. 290. 
24 Montaigne, Essays, p. 290. 
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male-female friendships inevitably fall into the Aristotelian categories of ‘pleasure’ 
and ‘advantage’ friendships, those lesser kinds of friendship founded solely upon the 
pleasure and utility that friends bring to one another, and not on the mutual 
recognition of moral excellence of character.  
John Norris takes a slightly more positive stance than Taylor toward women’s 
capacity for friendship. In a short essay on ‘The Measures of Friendship’ in his 
Theory and Regulation of Love (1688), Norris acknowledges that his work is heavily 
indebted to Taylor’s Discourse.25 Like Taylor, Norris defines friendship as a form of 
Christian charity, or 
 
a Kind of Revenging our selves upon the Narrowness of our Faculties, by 
exemplifying that extraordinary Charity upon One or Two which we both owe, 
and are also ready and disposed, but by reason of the Scantiness of our 
Condition, are not sufficiently able to exercise towards all. (‘Measures’, p. 104) 
 
Norris also affirms the possibility of male-female friendship when he observes that 
marriage is ‘the strictest of Friendships’ (‘Measures’, p. 108). But in ‘A Letter 
concerning Friendship’ in his earlier Collection of Miscellanies (1687), Norris goes 
further than Taylor by allowing that husbands and wives can enjoy equal friendships. 
In this ‘Letter’, he asks ‘whether in propriety of speaking there may be strict 
Friendship between a man and his wife’?26 To demonstrate that husbands and wives 
may be friends, Norris spells out the necessary conditions of friendship. First, he says 
(following the classical tradition), a friend must be a good or a virtuous person—a bad 
                                                
25 John Norris, ‘Measures of Friendship’, in The Theory and Regulation of Love. A Moral Essay, In 
Two Parts. To which are added, Letters Philosophical and Moral between the Author and Dr. Henry 
More, second edition (London: S. Manship, 1694), p. 105. 
26 John Norris, ‘Letter concerning Friendship’, in A Collection of Miscellanies: Consisting of Poems, 
Essays, Discourses, and Letters, Occasionally Written (Oxford: the Theater, 1687), p. 450. 
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person could never exercise true charity; second, a friend must be good-natured or 
have a ‘liberal, sweet, obliging temper’ in order to love his friend with an intenseness 
of affection; third, true friends must enjoy a ‘likeness of disposition’ or an 
‘agreeableness of humours’, otherwise their friendship is unlikely to endure; and 
fourth, true friends must be ‘few in Number’, because ‘tis impossible our love can be 
very intense when divided among many’ (‘Letter’, p. 452). Norris then observes that 
marriage can meet all these requirements of friendship, and that husbands and wives 
are therefore capable of being friends. He allows that there is an inequality between 
husbands and wives ‘both as to Sex and as to Conjugal Relation’ (‘Letter’, pp. 453–
54): the male sex is superior to the female, and husbands are superior to their wives. 
But unlike Taylor, Norris denies that such an inequality (whether it be natural or 
socially constructed, he does not say) constitutes a barrier to equal friendships. ‘Tis 
not absolutely necessary that Friends should stand upon a Level, either in respect of 
Fortune, State or Condition’ (‘Letter’, p. 454). The only equality that friendship 
requires is an equality of disposition and affection. 
In her Proposal, Astell explicitly draws on Norris’s Christianised conception 
of friendship (and, by implication, that of Jeremy Taylor). In one part of her work, 
Astell defines friendship as ‘nothing else but Charity contracted; it is (in the words of 
an admired Author) a kind of revenging our selves on the narrowness of our Faculties, 
by exemplifying that extraordinary charity on one or two, which we are willing but 
not able to exercise towards all’ (Proposal I, p. 36). Norris is, of course, the ‘admired 
Author’ in question, and this definition is taken almost verbatim from his ‘Measures 
of Friendship’ (quoted above).27 In her Reflections upon Marriage, Astell also echoes 
                                                
27 In her annotations to the Proposal, Springborg notes that John Norris ‘may well be the “admired 
Author”’, but mistakenly attributes these sentiments to the Letters concerning the Love of God, and not 
his Theory and Regulation of Love (see Proposal I, p. 62, n. 203). 
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Norris’s conception of marriage as a strict friendship that ‘admits but of one’ 
(‘Measures’, p. 108). Against the critics of marriage, she says 
 
Is it the being ty’d to One that offends us? Why this ought rather to recommend 
Marriage to us, and would really do so, were we guided by Reason, and not by 
Humour or brutish Passion. He who does not make Friendship the chief 
inducement of his Choice, and prefer it before any other consideration, does not 
deserve a good Wife, and therefore should not complain if he goes without one. 
How we can ever grow weary of our Friends; the longer we have had them the 
more they are endear’d to us; and if we have One well assur’d, we need seek no 
further, but are sufficiently happy in Her.28 
 
Nevertheless, Astell differs from both Taylor and Norris by moving beyond 
male-female friendships to consider the value of female-female friendships alone. In 
theory, neither Taylor nor Norris rules out the possibility that women are capable of 
equal virtuous friendships with other women. But they do not explicitly mention 
female friendship as a means by which women might come to rival men in terms of 
virtue and wisdom. Astell promotes their Christian conception of virtuous friendship 
as an intense form of the charity or disinterested benevolence that we owe to 
everyone. But she goes further than Taylor and Norris by considering such friendships 
between women as a way in which they might attain ‘all those excellencies by which 
Men can oblige the World’ (Taylor, Discourse, p. 88). 
On the topic of female-female friendship, Astell may have been inspired by 
the addressee of Taylor’s Discourse, Katherine Philips (1632–64), the poet popularly 
                                                
28 Astell, Reflections upon Marriage, in Astell: Political Writings, p. 37. 
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known as the ‘Matchless Orinda’. In the poem ‘A Friend’ (written after Taylor’s 
Discourse, and possibly as a response), Philips says that 
 
If Soules no Sexes have, for Men t’exclude 
Women from Friendship’s vast capacity, 
Is a Design injurious or rude, 
Onely maintain’d by partial tyranny.29 
 
Philips’ implication is that if true friendship is a friendship of souls (and not of 
bodies), then social inequalities should not preclude women from having equal 
friendships with either men or women. But Philips’ main interest lies with friendships 
between women.30 In her poem ‘To Mrs. Mary Awbrey’, she writes 
 
Soul of my Soul, my joy, my crown, my Friend, 
A name which all the rest doth comprehend; 
How happy are we now, whose Souls are grown 
By an incomparable mixture one …31 
 
Philips conceives of female friendship as a source of moral strength for women 
against the ‘Envy, Pride and Faction’ of ‘the dull World’.32 In the Proposal, Astell 
openly displays her admiration for Philips, emphasising the importance of female role 
models, and urging her readers to remember ‘the famous Women of former Ages’ and 
                                                
29 Katherine Philips, ‘A Friend’, in Poems, By the most deservedly Admired Mrs. Katherine Philips The 
matchless Orinda (London: J.M. for H. Herringman, 1667), p. 95. 
30 On this subject, see Harriette Andreadis, ‘Re-configuring Early Modern Friendship: Katherine 
Philips and Homoerotic Desire’, Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900 46, no. 3 (2006), 523–42.  
31 Philips, ‘To Mrs. Mary Awbrey’, in Poems, pp. 70–71. 
32 Philips, ‘To Mrs. Mary Awbrey’, in Poems, p. 71. 
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‘the Orinda’s of late’ (Proposal I, p. 7). She hopes that ‘our own incomparable 
Orinda’ will ‘excite the Emulation of the English Ladies’ (Proposal I, p. 24). She may 
also be deliberately echoing Philips when she says that ‘Friendship is a Vertue which 
comprehends all the rest’ (Proposal I, p. 36). Astell builds upon Philips’ insight that 
female friendships can act as ‘props’ or support networks for women who hold 
unconventional or unfashionable views. In this last respect, Astell’s feminist 
programme moves beyond a radical subjectivity (the project of self-transformation 
alone) to an other-centred project of moral reformation in which friendship plays an 
important role.  
 
III. Friendship, moral growth, and social change 
Recent feminists have also focussed on the morally transformative power of 
friendship. In her 1993 work on feminism and moral theory, What are Friends For?, 
Marilyn Friedman addresses a problem posed by some recent versions of 
communitarian theory. In opposition to the abstract individualism of liberal theory, 
the communitarian maintains that the self is constituted by its personal, social, and 
communal (or community) ties.33 The problem is that the ‘moral starting points’ of 
communitarian theory—families, schools, churches, and neighbourhoods—have often 
played a key role in perpetuating social roles and structures that are oppressive to 
women.34 For a feminist philosopher, this presents the difficulty ‘of accounting for the 
possibility of social criticism and resistance on the part of the self who is constituted 
by the very social relationships and cultural traditions that would be the target of her 
                                                
33 Marilyn Friedman, What are Friends For? Feminist Perspectives on Personal Relationships and 
Moral Theory (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993). See also Marilyn Friedman, 
‘Feminism and Modern Friendship: Dislocating the Community’, in Friendship: A Philosophical 
Reader, ed. Neera Kapur Badhwar (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 285–302. 
34 Friedman, What are Friends For?, pp. 233, 236. Friedman borrows the phrase ‘moral starting point’ 
from the communitarian philosopher, Alasdair MacIntyre.  
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resistance’.35 An individual woman, after all, does not always have the personal 
resources necessary to challenge the moral community into which she was born and 
raised. Friedman observes that true moral growth occurs ‘when we learn to grasp our 
experiences in a new light or in radically different terms’; and such growth ‘involves a 
shift in moral paradigms, in the basic values, rules, or principles which shape moral 
thought and behaviour’.36 To gain this shift, we often require the assistance of other 
people, and especially those individuals who are committed to promoting our best 
interests. This is where friendship becomes important. Friends can help us to reorient 
our moral thinking and thus reflect critically on our ‘moral starting points’. For 
Friedman, friendship can also be a socially and politically disruptive force—it can 
help us to challenge the subordination of women in our communities of origin, and 
thus initiate social change. 
On first reading, it is not clear that Astell’s conception of friendship is meant to 
be socially or politically disruptive in this sense. We might regard Astell’s conception 
of friendship as a mere extension of her Christian views about the importance of 
‘being dead to the things of this world’ (Proposal I, p. 34) and focusing on one’s 
spiritual life and the path to salvation. In Astell’s view, it is not the role of friends to 
encourage the overthrow of traditional religious beliefs and practices, but rather to 
apply the principles underlying those beliefs (and especially those of the Anglican 
religion) diligently and consistently. Above all, we must be concerned about the 
friend’s soul and about setting her on the right path to salvation. In short, this is 
friendship as a contraction of Christian charity, the kind of friendship promoted by 
Taylor and Norris. 
                                                
35 Friedman, What are Friends For?, p. 3. 
36 Friedman, What are Friends For?, p. 196. 
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Even on a conservative reading, however, we cannot ignore the fact that, for 
Astell, virtuous friendship is essentially other-centred or other-interested rather than 
self-centred or self-interested in nature. In so far as virtuous friendship is about 
‘bettering the beloved Person’, such friendship promotes a moral transformation 
beyond the individual herself. And while, in Astell’s view, virtuous friendship should 
not lead women to question their given religious beliefs, it can lead women to 
identify, and then resist, society’s deviations from Christian teaching. Astell promotes 
the power of female friendships to counter the customs and conventions of 
seventeenth-century England, and especially those that degrade a woman’s spiritual or 
intellectual worth. The chief purpose of her ‘Amicable Society’ is to ‘disarm’ custom 
and to re-programme the moral orientations of women, such that they no longer do as 
their neighbours do, ‘meerly in complyance with an unreasonable Fashion’ (Proposal 
I, pp. 20, 37, 15). Astell would agree with Friedman that, as pre-eminent relationships 
outside of the family, friendships can permit women to reflect critically on their 
‘moral starting points’.  
On the subject of moral growth, Astell’s views are reminiscent of those of 
Cicero (106–43 BC) in his Laelius, De amicitia (Laelius on Friendship, 44 BC). 
Though there is no explicit acknowledgement, Astell echoes his advice about the 
importance of mutual admonition among friends. Cicero says that 
 
’tis the property of cordial Friendship mutually to admonish and to be 
admonish’d, and as the one is to be done with all Freedom, but without any 
Sharpness, and the other to be taken with all Patience and without any 
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murmuring: so we may be sure that there is no great Canker to Friendship than 
Flattery, fawning and assentation.37 
 
On the one hand, a friend’s admonition must be without severity, or else she risks 
losing her friend’s affection; but on the other, a friend should be willing to hear 
reproofs, and glad that a friend has been honest and upfront about her faults.38 
Likewise, in Astell’s view, friends have a duty ‘to watch over each other for Good, to 
advise, encourage and direct, and to observe the minutest fault in order to its 
amendment’ (Proposal I, p. 37). Female friendship is about correcting other women’s 
faults, and setting other women on the right path to virtue and wisdom, ‘by sweetness 
not severity; by friendly Admonitions, not magisterial Reproofs’ (Proposal I, p. 28). 
In her later work, The Christian Religion, As Profess’d by a Daughter Of The 
Church of England (1705), Astell expands at length on this theme, by spelling out the 
crucial difference between friends and flatterers.39 She emphasises that a flatterer 
‘only means to Serve himself’, whereas a friend ‘has no design but to do us Service’ 
(Christian Religion, p. 227). In particular, a friend will serve us in our ‘most 
important Interest’ (Christian Religion, pp. 231–32), and ‘do good to the Mind’ or 
soul (Christian Religion, p. 233). Friendship is a form of Christian charity, and we do 
the greatest charity to someone when we ‘watch over his Soul, and … promote his 
                                                
37 Marcus Tullius Cicero, Cicero’s Laelius. A Discourse of Friendship. Together with a Pastoral 
Dialogue Concerning Friendship and Love (London: Wlliam Crooke, 1691), p. 61. Astell may have 
been familiar with this late-seventeenth-century English translation. 
38 In mid-seventeenth-century England, this aspect of friendship is once again highlighted in the 
tremendously popular religious work, The Whole Duty of Man (1658). This anonymous work is now 
thought to be by Richard Allestree (1619–81), an author whom Astell greatly admired. On Astell and 
Allestree, see Hannah Smith, ‘Mary Astell, A Serious Proposal to the Ladies (1694), and the Anglican 
Reformation of Manners in Late-Seventeenth-Century England’, in Mary Astell: Reason, Gender, 
Faith, eds. William Kolbrener and Michal Michelson (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 31–47 (esp. pp. 
37–38). 
39 Astell may have been acquainted with Plutarch’s highly influential essay on this subject, ‘How to 
know a Flatterer from a Friend’, in his Morals. Plutarch’s text was widely available in English 
translation in the late seventeenth century. 
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Perfection to the utmost’ (Christian Religion, p. 231). For this reason, a virtuous 
friend will not hesitate to admonish her friend, if it may do her good. Admonition 
prompts us to improve in virtue, whereas flattery merely leads us to complacency. 
Astell says that  
 
I cou’d never understand the meaning of some who call themselves our Friends, 
to be sure I cou’d never comply with them, when they expect to be follow’d 
Right or Wrong in their Principles, Party, and Passions, looking for a blind 
Approbation, or if they are more Refin’d, an Artful Pretence of being convinc’d 
of the Reasonableness of all they propose. … Who will not be help’d to be in 
Reality, those Excellent Persons which every one must wish to be; but who 
wou’d be Flatter’d as if they were so already, when alas! they are nothing like it. 
(Christian Religion, pp. 232–33) 
 
While a flatterer might provide us with some immediate pleasure, they do us a greater 
disservice in the long run. Like Cicero, Astell also adds that it is the duty of friends 
not only to admonish but to be admonished. She says 
 
But tho’ it were the utmost baseness to submit to their Usurpation and Tyranny, 
by parting with that most valuable Privilege, and indefeasible Right, of judging 
for our selves where GOD has left us free to do so; yet far be it from us to 
pretend to Infallibility and Self-sufficiency; to despise any one’s Lights, or to 
reject their Advice, with whatever Spirit it may be offer’d. For as I plac’d 
Christian Friendship in giving frank Advice, so I now reckon the taking it 
among the Duties we owe to our Selves. Nor can we be more unkind to our own 
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Souls, or guilty of a greater Folly, than by supposing we are too Great, or too 
Wise, or too Good to be Advis’d. (Christian Religion, pp. 288–89) 
 
To consider examples of such admonition, we need go no further than Astell’s 
own exhortations to her readers in the Proposal. Nearly all of her reproofs are directed 
against a woman’s concern with attracting the eyes of men to her body. Astell asks 
women ‘How can you be content to be in the world like Tulips in a Garden, to make a 
fine shew and be good for nothing?’ (Proposal I, p. 7).40 She insists that women 
should take pride in more than ‘the invention of a Fashion’ (Proposal I, p. 8), and the 
having of ‘a more ingenious Taylor or Milliner than her neighbour’ (Proposal I, p. 
13). They should value themselves on something more than their clothes, and should 
not fret about the signs of aging in their face (Proposal I, p. 29). They should be 
unconcerned about being called an ‘Old Maid’ (Proposal I, p. 43), and they should 
ignore the scoffs of ‘ludicrous Wits and pert Buffoons’ (Proposal I, p. 44). They 
should not waste their precious time in pursuit of ‘idle Amusements’ (Proposal I, p. 
29), such as plays and romances, and they should avoid gossip or ‘uncharitable and 
vain Conversation’ (Proposal I, p. 24). They should not pride themselves on the 
‘delicacy’ of their humour, or become unreasonably anxious and irritable about trivial 
matters (Proposal I, p. 31). They should be indifferent to ‘a sounding Title or a great 
Estate’ (Proposal I, p. 5), and to the admiration of ‘vain insignificant men’ (Proposal 
I, p. 8). They should not respect someone merely ‘in proportion to that Pomp and 
Bustle they make in the world’ (Proposal I, p. 30). 
                                                
40 It is possible that Astell borrows her turn of phrase from Taylor’s Discourse. In that work, Taylor 
warns that, when contracting a friendship, one should look for a worthy friend who will profit as well 
as delight: ‘I had rather see Time [i.e. Thyme] and Roses, Marjoram and July flowers that are fair and 
sweet and medicinal,’ he says, ‘then the prettiest Tulips that are good for nothing’ (Discourse, pp. 39–
40). 
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It is possible to see how such ‘friendly admonition’ might lead to a reformation 
in one or two of our closest friends. It is also apparent how friendships of this nature 
might lead us to reflect critically on gender attitudes in our families. Astell’s friendly 
institution is designed as a retreat not only from predatory men but also from family 
pressures. In these environs, she says, a woman ‘will be neither bought nor sold, nor 
be forc’d to marry for her own quiet, when she has no inclination to it’ (Proposal I, p. 
39). But it is not immediately clear how such female friendships might bring about 
social reform in a more general sense. There are one or two passages, however, that 
suggest that Astell conceives of female friendship as a socially disruptive force. At the 
start of an extended passage on friendship, Astell says that 
 
Probably one considerable cause of the degeneracy of the present Age, is the 
little true Friendship that is to be found in it; or perhaps you will rather say, that 
this is the effect of our corruption. The cause and the effect are indeed 
reciprocal; for were the World better, there wou’d be more Friendship, and were 
there more Friendship we shou’d have a better World. But because Iniquity 
abounds, therefore the love of many is not only waxen cold,41 but quite 
benumb’d and perish’d. But if we have such narrow hearts, be so full of 
mistaken Self-love, so unreasonably fond of our selves, that we cannot spare a 
hearty Good-will to one or two choice Persons, how can it ever be thought, that 
we shou’d well acquit our selves of that Charity which is due to all Mankind? 
(Proposal I, p. 36) 
 
                                                
41 Matthew 24:12: ‘And because iniquity shall abound, the love of many shall wax cold’. 
 26 
Here Astell explicitly promotes the power of friendship (as a form of Christian 
charity) to lead to the moral improvement of society at large. In another passage, she 
indicates how her institution might inspire such wider social change. She says 
 
because we were not made for our selves, nor can by any means so effectually 
glorify God, and do good to our own Souls, as by doing offices of charity and 
Beneficence to others; and to the intent, that every Vertue, and the highest 
degrees of every Vertue may be exercis’d and promoted to the most that may 
be; your Retreat shall be so manag’d as not to exclude the good Works of an 
Active, from the pleasure and serenity of a contemplative Life, but a due mixture 
of both retain all the advantages and avoid the inconveniences that attend either. 
It shall not cut you off from the world as to hinder you from bettering and 
improving it, but rather qualify you to do it the greatest Good, and be a 
Seminary to stock the Kingdom with pious and prudent Ladies; whose good 
Example it is to be hop’d, will so influence the rest of their Sex, that Women 
may no longer pass for those useless and impertinent Animals (Proposal I, p. 
21). 
 
In short, as a contraction of Christian charity, virtuous friendship prepares us for the 
performance of charitable acts in the wider world. Once female friends have left the 
retreat, their virtue is likely to inspire the emulation of their fellow women and 
thereby bring about ‘a Reformation in others’ (Proposal I, p. 41).42 By their example, 
other women would also be prompted to see that ‘God has given Women as well as 
                                                
42 Astell herself partly succeeded in inspiring such emulation: her discussion of friendship clearly 
influenced Mary Chudleigh’s essay on the subject. See Mary Chudleigh, ‘Of Friendship’, in The Poems 
and Prose of Mary, Lady Chudleigh, ed. Margaret J. M. Ezell (New York and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), pp. 343–52. Unlike Astell, however, Chudleigh directly challenges Norris’s 
conditions for friendship (see p. 347). 
 27 
Men intelligent Souls’ (Proposal I, p. 22), and would come to value themselves 
accordingly. Such social change would not be widespread or revolutionary in the 
modern political sense, but it would nevertheless be social change to the extent that it 
would involve a transformation in social attitudes, norms, and practices toward 
women. 
At this point, we might be tempted to say that Astell’s high regard for 
friendship gives her something in common with her political enemies, the Whig 
tolerationists and the ‘republic of letters’ for whom friendship was also a means to 
moral improvement.43 But such comparisons would be hasty. Like Astell, the 
members of this circle—including John Locke, Philip van Limborch, Jean Le Clerc, 
and others—were committed to the ‘disarming’ of custom; but they valued friendship 
primarily as a means by which to challenge unquestioned preconceptions and 
prejudices, and thereby become less dogmatic and more open to the discovery of 
truth.44 By contrast, Astell emphasises that friends can assist us in holding onto 
conservative religious views (such as those of the Anglican faith), and urge us to 
apply them consistently, especially in the face of opposition from family and society; 
friends can help us to become more dogmatic, rather than less so. 
In conclusion, we might think that, given the conservative religious nature of 
her views, Astell’s feminism must remain unpalatable to our modern sensibilities. 
Many modern feminists would certainly blanch at her failure to ‘cry up Liberty to 
poor Female Slaves’ (Reflections, pp. 46–7) or to challenge those social and political 
structures in which women are subordinate to men. But it is still the case that Astell 
embraces friendship as a way in which to bring about social reform: ‘were there more 
                                                
43 For a recent study, see John Marshall, John Locke, Toleration and Early Enlightenment Culture 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
44 On this subject, see Richard Yeo, ‘John Locke on Conversation with Friends and Strangers’, also in 
this volume. 
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Friendship,’ she says, ‘we shou’d have a better World’ (Proposal I, p. 36). With this 
desire to see ‘a better World’ for women—in the here and now, and not the 
hereafter—Astell has more in common with modern feminists than previously 
thought.45 
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